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NOAM MAGGOR
IN 1875, CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS JR., the scion of the illustrious Boston family, used
the pages of the North American Review to reflect on radical Granger legislation that
was gaining support throughout the western United States and authorizing state reg-
ulation of railroad freight rates. The situation in the West, he explained to his distin-
guished readers, was not unlike the one “brought about in India in the last century.”
Whereas the shares of the East India Company had been held entirely in England,
“the empire from which the company drew its income was in Hindostan.” The execu-
tives of the company, eager to satisfy their “distant” owners’ “incessant demand for
dividends,” had shown too little regard for “the misery their exactions caused.” Simi-
lar tensions, Adams argued, existed in the case of the American railroad system. The
roads’ owners “did not live in the West” and knew little about conditions there.
Wishing to avoid “trouble in the next stockholders’ meeting” back east, managers ex-
tracted revenue from those properties in utter indifference to the western communi-
ties the roads actually served. There was, however, one key difference between the
two cases. Being “of the same race” as the owners, Adams observed, American farm-
ers were far more prone to “measures of retaliation” than their “Asiatic” counter-
parts. They did not “long submit . . . to the very appreciable ignoring of their rights.”
Hence the immense public support for the Granger Laws—those “most wanton as-
saults upon property”—enjoyed in places such as Iowa, Wisconsin, and Illinois.1
Only a few years earlier, the relationship between the two regions—the capital-
saturated East and the capital-poor West—had seemed to be headed in a much
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more propitious direction. Unlike other colonial relations, at least in Adams’s analy-
sis, this one began at the behest of the colonized. The “constant longing” of those
men and women on the prairie, he wrote, was “railroads, more railroads.” Their
imaginations “thoroughly fired” with commercial possibilities, they “eagerly invited
foreigners [i.e., men from outside the region] to build railroads for them.” “Loaded
with maps and plans and prospectuses, and stock and bonds and land grants,” they
made their way “into every money market of the world.” They spared no induce-
ments, incentives, or concessions to “tempt foreign capital.” Only after a seemingly
“inexhaustible stream” of investments poured in, financing railroads in great abun-
dance (and great excess), did westerners realize that they had made an “improvident
bargain.” They awoke to the massive costs of this system of transportation, which
they did not own, but for whose construction their freight charges were ultimately
bound to pay. The “impetuous” farmers thus turned against their eastern benefac-
tors, with their “anger blazed up,” and became “deaf to reason, to law, or to consid-
erations of remote [i.e., long-term] self-interest.”2 What might have seemed to some
like a synergic relationship that benefited both sides had clearly soured, triggering a
menacing wave of animosity and political unrest.
Adams’s reflections on the connections between the financial resources of the East
and railroad development in the vast expanses of the West foregrounded the key axis
of American capitalism in the closing decades of the nineteenth century. As eastern
money migrated across the continent to finance railroads (as well as mines, farms,
stockyards, industry, construction, and a host of other ventures), it energized the ab-
sorption of the Great West into the economic orbit of the United States. This ready
availability of the continent’s bounty drove the emergence of enormous urban centers
and the rise of large-scale manufacturing. It transformed the United States from its
former position in the world economy as primarily an exporter of agricultural com-
modities—cotton, above all—into an industrial nation in its own right, increasingly or-
ganized around its own domestic market.3 Far from seamless or smooth, this momen-
tous transition was accompanied by numerous political controversies and challenges
that Adams’s patrician perspective captured only partially and tendentiously.
The integration of vast territories of what became the American West into the
political economy of the United States was part and parcel of a much larger transfor-
mation that left virtually no corner of the globe untouched. Mobilizing to bring conti-
nental interiors under direct territorial management, capitalist development and its
entwined political projects greatly intensified their domination of these areas.4 Global
2 Ibid., 397, 400, 397, 398, 405.
3 On the transition from the Atlantic economy of earlier decades to continental industrialization, in-
cluding a critique of the overdetermined nature of most accounts of this process, see James Livingston,
Pragmatism and the Political Economy of Cultural Revolution, 1850–1940 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1994), 31–49;
Sven Beckert, The Monied Metropolis: New York City and the Consolidation of the American Bourgeoisie,
1850–1896 (Cambridge, 2001); Richard Franklin Bensel, The Political Economy of American Industrializa-
tion, 1877–1900 (Cambridge, 2000). For the broad economic contours of the process in the United States,
see Edward B. Barbier, Scarcity and Frontiers: How Economies Have Developed through Natural Resource
Exploitation (Cambridge, 2011), 394–402; Ronald Findlay and Kevin H. O’Rourke, Power and Plenty:
Trade, War, and the World Economy in the Second Millennium (Princeton, N.J., 2007), 411–412; Gavin
Wright, “The Origins of American Industrial Success, 1879–1940,” American Economic Review 80, no. 4
(1990): 651–668, here 651.
4 This process has been much commented on. See Charles S. Maier, Once within Borders: Territories
of Power, Wealth, and Belonging since 1500 (Cambridge, Mass., 2016); Jürgen Osterhammel, The Trans-
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histories of this era routinely invoke the western United States in the same breath as
other peripheries that were pulled into the world economy. These studies evocatively
mention the transcontinental Union Pacific Railroad alongside the trans-Andean
Peruvian Central Railway, the prairies and mountains of North America alongside
the Indian subcontinent, the Nile Valley, and the hinterlands of Latin America.5 But
since the integration of these territories into the world market took place primarily
within the formal borders of the American nation-state, not in colonial territories
overseas, the embattled political history of the process has not been sufficiently scru-
tinized.6 The assumption that the American Civil War permanently eliminated re-
gional fractures, producing an internally coherent and exceptionally stable political
regime, lent resilience and credibility to the idea that the eventuality of a consoli-
dated national market was never really in question. Rather than a contingent and
formation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century, trans. Patrick Camiller (Princeton,
N.J., 2014); C. A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons
(Malden, Mass., 2004); Michael Geyer and Charles Bright, “World History in a Global Age,” American
Historical Review 100, no. 4 (October 1995): 1034–1060; Sven Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A Global History
(New York, 2014); David Harvey, The New Imperialism (Oxford, 2003); E. J. Hobsbawm, The Age of
Capital, 1848–1875 (New York, 1996); Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire, 1875–1914 (New York, 1989).
5 For example, see Osterhammel, The Transformation of the World, chap. 7; Barbier, Scarcity and
Frontiers, 368–428; Findlay and O’Rourke, Power and Plenty, 381–395; Jürgen Osterhammel, Globaliza-
tion: A Short History, trans. Dona Geyer (Princeton, N.J., 2005), 68, 87–88; Hobsbawm, The Age of Capi-
tal, 55–56; Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 439–444; Charles S. Maier, “Consigning the Twentieth
Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era,” American Historical Review 105, no. 3
(June 2000): 807–831, here 814, 820.
6 At least not recently. The groundbreaking New Western History brought much-needed attention
to Indian dispossession and environmental degradation but tended to neglect more prosaic questions
about political economy. See most notably Patricia Nelson Limerick, The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbro-
ken Past of the American West (New York, 1987); William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the
Great West (New York, 1991); Richard White, “It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own”: A History of
the American West (Norman, Okla., 1991); Donald Worster, Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and the
Growth of the American West (New York, 1985). These questions were the focus of earlier scholarship
about the West, which, for all its major flaws, blind spots, and under-theorization, produced meticulous
studies of what might be called the banal architecture of American empire, including issues such as terri-
torial politics, military action, land policy, and foreign investment. See the work of Paul W. Gates, Allan
G. Bogue, Howard R. Lamar, Earl S. Pomeroy, John D. Hicks, Carter Goodrich, William H. Goetz-
mann, Francis Paul Prucha, James C. Malin, E. Louis Peffer, Gene M. Gressley, Clark C. Spence, and
Rodman W. Paul. Ironically, political economy has come back to western history via recent scholarship
on Native Americans, which examines Indian polities as strategic historical actors that wielded immense
coercive and commercial power in sophisticated ways. See Pekka H€am€al€ainen, The Comanche Empire
(New Haven, Conn., 2008); Brian DeLay, War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.-Mexican
War (New Haven, Conn., 2008). Both White and Limerick have lately come full circle to these age-old
topics. See Richard White, Railroaded: The Transcontinentals and the Making of Modern America (New
York, 2011); Patricia Nelson Limerick, A Ditch in Time: The City, the West, and Water (Golden, Colo.,
2012).
The effort to problematize the nation-state from within ought to be an integral part of the postna-
tional turn in historical scholarship. This turn has thus far mostly attracted attention to transnational in-
teractions but left subnational questions relatively underexplored. See the by now canonical Daniel T.
Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age (Cambridge, Mass., 1998); Thomas
Bender, ed., Rethinking American History in a Global Age (Berkeley, Calif., 2002). For a theoretical treat-
ment of “scale” that draws on the sociological literature on globalization, see Neil Brenner, New State
Spaces: Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood (Oxford, 2006); Brenner, “Beyond State-Cen-
trism? Space, Territoriality, and Geographical Scale in Globalization Studies,” Theory and Society 28, no.
1 (1999): 39–78. See also Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space (Malden, Mass., 2011). Scholars writ-
ing about development in China have recently moved to fruitfully “disaggregate the nation.” For an over-
view, see Meg E. Rithmire, “China’s ‘New Regionalism’: Subnational Analysis in Chinese Political
Economy,” World Politics 66, no. 1 (2014): 165–194.
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contested project, its formation seemed like a foregone conclusion, and was thus not
in need of historical explanation.7
In this vein, historians of business have taken for granted the continental scale of
the modern U.S. economy. The literature about the inexorable rise of “managerial
capitalism” has drawn its persuasive power and remarkably long shelf life from this
assumption. Bracketing out questions about geography and power, this immensely in-
fluential scholarship has downplayed the significance of the financial system and in-
stead cast American industrialization as an administrative transformation, bereft of
meaningful politics or social contestation.8 The same methodological nationalism has
characterized much of the study of American state formation. The notion that mar-
ket activity would necessarily take place on a national scale has allowed many of its
constitutive political underpinnings to fade into the backdrop. Instead of investigat-
ing the development of political institutions as fully constitutive of economic change
and therefore closely intertwined with capitalist imperatives from the outset, much of
the literature cast the growth of American government as a belated “response” to a
fully realized process of industrialization.9 This approach has failed to capture many
of the priorities that defined state formation as a historical process. It has rendered
immaterial, or at the very least incomprehensible, large swaths of policy questions
that animated American politics in this period.
The incorporation of the West into the economic orbit of the United States was
nevertheless a contested and contradictory process, analogous in crucial ways to tur-
bulent transitions in other peripheral regions in the world economy. It hinged on an
uneasy relationship between financial networks that penetrated the deep interiors of
North America and emergent state institutions that facilitated and regulated that
7 Charles Bright and Michael Geyer have cautioned against neglect of “the myriad sectional tensions
and regional rebellions that undermined rickety states and strained the ligaments of constitutional struc-
tures” throughout the Western Hemisphere. Bright and Geyer, “Where in the World Is America? The
History of the United States in the Global Age,” in Bender, Rethinking American History in a Global Age,
63–99, here 75. On the overstated notion of American political “stability” as a legacy of postwar notions
of American exceptionalism, see Gregory P. Downs, “The Mexicanization of American Politics: The
United States’ Transnational Path from Civil War to Stabilization,” American Historical Review 117, no. 2
(April 2012): 387–409. See also Rachel St. John, “The Unpredictable America of William Gwin: Expan-
sion, Secession, and the Unstable Borders of Nineteenth-Century North America,” Journal of the Civil
War Era 6, no. 1 (2016): 56–84. For a framework that emphasizes the persistent tensions between a rela-
tively weak “center” of American empire and “centrifugal” forces—states, regions, and constituencies—
threatening to pull out of its orbit, see Steven Hahn, “Slave Emancipation, Indian Peoples, and the Proj-
ects of a New American Nation-State,” Journal of the Civil War Era 3, no. 3 (2013): 307–330, here 311.
8 Alfred D. Chandler Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cam-
bridge, Mass., 1977); Chandler, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Cambridge,
Mass., 1994); Louis Galambos, “The Emerging Organizational Synthesis in Modern American History,”
Business History Review 44, no. 3 (1970): 279–290.
9 The voluminous literature on “reform” has generally accepted the historical subjects’ view of the
U.S. government in the nineteenth century as either absent, corrupt, or inadequate in some objective
sense. See, most notably, Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York, 1955);
Samuel P. Hays, The Response to Industrialism, 1885–1914 (Chicago, 1957); Robert H. Wiebe, The Search
for Order, 1877–1920 (New York, 1967). For a useful critique of the more recent literature on American
political development, particularly its difficulty in examining American institutions on their own terms, see
William J. Novak, “The Myth of the ‘Weak’ American State,” American Historical Review 113, no. 3 (June
2008): 752–772; Novak, “Beyond Max Weber: The Need for a Democratic (Not Aristocratic) Theory of the
Modern State,” The Tocqueville Review/La Revue Tocqueville 36, no. 1 (2015): 43–91. Recent correctives in-
clude Gary Gerstle, Liberty and Coercion: The Paradox of American Government from the Founding to the
Present (Princeton, N.J., 2015); Brian Balogh, A Government out of Sight: The Mystery of National Authority
in Nineteenth-Century America (Cambridge, 2009).
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movement. Among those who made deliberate efforts to redeploy capital toward
new ventures in the trans-Mississippi West were members of the financial elite of
Boston, the second-largest financial center in the United States. As the growth of the
Boston-owned stockyards of Kansas City illustrates, these eastern financiers—like fi-
nanciers elsewhere around the world at the time—had the capacity to reinvent major
industries, establish new urban centers, set large populations in motion, and revolu-
tionize the ecologies of entire regions.10 Such transformation accelerated the process
of state formation in the West, turning federally controlled territories—Colorado,
Montana, Wyoming, Idaho, the Dakotas, and Washington—into semi-sovereign
states. As delegates in these territories gathered for constitutional conventions, they
contended with key policy questions such as water rights, corporate regulation, and
industrial relations.11 Their conversations revolved thematically around issues of dis-
tribution, legibility, and space, altogether illuminating the problem of political juris-
diction in an interconnected economy.
The constitutional deliberations surrounding these issues generated a wide-rang-
ing debate, not over whether market integration should proceed, but rather “on what
terms, by whose rules, and with what payoffs,” to use Charles Bright and Michael
Geyer’s broadly conceived appraisal of the politics of nineteenth-century globaliza-
tion.12 In this sense, these debates paralleled similarly charged contests in places
such as Mexico, Argentina, India, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire over the forma-
tion of property rights regimes in an era of globally mobile capital.13 What set Ameri-
10 Small and favorably positioned groups of financiers from the Northeast in this period developed
the “scarce talent . . . to mobilize capital.” See Lance E. Davis, “Capital Immobilities and Finance Capi-
talism: A Study of Economic Evolution in the United States, 1820–1920,” Explorations in Entrepreneurial
History 1, no. 1 (1963): 88–105, here 88. See also P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Inno-
vation and Expansion, 1688–1914 (London, 1993). The focus on these men dovetails well with Fernand
Braudel’s much broader emphasis on the topmost layer in the hierarchy of global trade—actors situated
at “the commanding heights”—as key agents in such large-scale economic transformations. Braudel, Civ-
ilization and Capitalism, 15th–18th Century, vol. 2: The Wheels of Commerce, trans. Siân Reynolds (New
York, 1982), 381. See also Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins
of Our Times, 2nd ed. (New York, 2010), 10. For the post-Chandlerian revival of finance as a topic of his-
torical inquiry, see White, Railroaded; Julia C. Ott, When Wall Street Met Main Street: The Quest for an
Investors’ Democracy (Cambridge, Mass., 2011); Louis Hyman, Debtor Nation: The History of America in
Red Ink (Princeton, N.J., 2011); Jonathan Levy, Freaks of Fortune: The Emerging World of Capitalism and
Risk in America (Cambridge, Mass., 2012); Susie J. Pak, Gentlemen Bankers: The World of J. P. Morgan
(Cambridge, Mass., 2013).
11 The classic study on this topic remains John D. Hicks, The Constitutions of the Northwest States
(Lincoln, Nebr., 1923). This piece is deeply indebted to Hicks, as well as to Amy Bridges’s more recent
and comprehensive effort to grapple with this overshadowed dimension of American state formation.
See Bridges, “Managing the Periphery in the Gilded Age: Writing Constitutions for the Western States,”
Studies in American Political Development 22, no. 1 (2008): 32–58. State-level constitutionalism has
gained increasing attention from legal scholars under the somewhat ahistorical rubric of “federalism.”
See, for example, Christian G. Fritz, “The American Constitutional Tradition Revisited: Preliminary
Observations on State Constitution-Making in the Nineteenth-Century West,” Rutgers Law Journal 25,
no. 4 (1994): 945–998; Marsha L. Baum and Christian G. Fritz, “American Constitution-Making: The
Neglected State Constitutional Sources,” Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 27, no. 2 (2000): 199–242;
G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions (Princeton, N.J., 1998); John J. Dinan, The American
State Constitutional Tradition (Lawrence, Kans., 2006); Emily Zackin, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong
Places: Why State Constitutions Contain America’s Positive Rights (Princeton, N.J., 2013). See also Gordon
Morris Bakken, Rocky Mountain Constitution Making, 1850–1912 (New York, 1987); David Alan John-
son, Founding the Far West: California, Oregon, and Nevada, 1840–1890 (Berkeley, Calif., 1992).
12 Bright and Geyer, “Where in the World Is America?,” 71.
13 The creation of political institutions in this age of global financial flows is a prominent theme in a
range of scholarships on other peripheries. See, for example, Şevket Pamuk, The Ottoman Empire and
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can debates apart from other cases was the direct participation of non-property-own-
ing citizens in the constitution-writing process. Notwithstanding Adams’s racial diag-
nosis of the westerners’ unruly proclivities, their oppositional tendencies were rooted
not in some biological or cultural predisposition, but in their political enfranchise-
ment and leverage within government.14 Thus politically empowered, these delegates
emphatically affirmed the primacy of state authorities over corporate interests. They
analyzed property rights not as immutable or somehow natural, but as subject to ne-
gotiation. They considered laborers’ efforts to mobilize in collective ways as desir-
able, and therefore deserving of government support. Their conversations envisioned
a wide spectrum of possibilities for a capacious democratic state.
The vision of the state that emerges from these constitutional deliberations sheds
light on the significance and meaning of late-nineteenth-century populism, a phe-
nomenon that has long befuddled historians of the United States.15 It reframes popu-
lism as a key feature of American state formation in the context of fundamental conflict
over the terms of market integration. It recasts American populists, not as reactive or
reformist, but as proactive participants in the creation of a new political economy. It
underscores in particular their tendency to open up for democratic political delibera-
tion that which liberal political economists at the time insisted should be bracketed
out as technical or apolitical. Despite their general sense of grievance against eastern
capitalists, western constitution writers were clearly not “impetuous” or somehow
European Capitalism, 1820–1913: Trade, Investment, and Production (Cambridge, 1987); Jeremy Adel-
man, Republic of Capital: Buenos Aires and the Legal Transformation of the Atlantic World (Stanford,
Calif., 1999); John Mason Hart, Empire and Revolution: The Americans in Mexico since the Civil War
(Berkeley, Calif., 2002); Cyrus Veeser, “Concessions as a Modernizing Strategy in the Dominican
Republic,” Business History Review 83, no. 4 (2009): 731–758; Ritu Birla, Stages of Capital: Law, Culture,
and Market Governance in Late Colonial India (Durham, N.C., 2009); Olivier Accominotti, Marc Flan-
dreau, Riad Rezzik, and Frédéric Zumber, “Black Man’s Burden, White Man’s Welfare: Control, Devo-
lution and Development in the British Empire, 1880–1914,” European Review of Economic History 14,
no. 1 (2010): 47–70; Ekaterina Pravilova, A Public Empire: Property and the Quest for the Common Good
in Imperial Russia (Princeton, N.J., 2014); Alison Frank, “The Petroleum War of 1910: Standard Oil,
Austria, and the Limits of the Multinational Corporation,” American Historical Review 114, no. 1 (Febru-
ary 2009): 16–41. Historians of other peripheries have sometimes cast the United States too unproblem-
atically as the obvious “other,” thereby unwittingly contributing to notions of U.S. exceptionalism. See,
for example, Adelman, Republic of Capital, 205.
14 Adams’s association of political empowerment with “race” is an ironic mirror image of Adolph
Reed Jr.’s recent emphasis on race as a political category, defined as “an especially durable kind of as-
criptive civic status in the context of American capitalism and the political and ideological structures
through which it is reproduced as a social order.” Reed, “Unraveling the Relation of Race and Class in
American Politics,” Political Power and Social Theory 15 (2002): 265–274, here 266. The capacity of en-
franchised citizens to set the terms of market exchange was precisely at stake in those conventions.
It deserves special emphasis that, regardless of Adams’s evocative parallel between the West and In-
dia, delegates at constitutional conventions represented a settler population, which was integral to Amer-
ican empire and, as this article makes clear, certainly not indigenous to the region. More broadly on
settler colonialism, see Aziz Rana, The Two Faces of American Freedom (Cambridge, Mass., 2010); James
Belich, Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783–1939 (Oxford,
2009).
15 On American populism, see most notably John Donald Hicks, The Populist Revolt: A History of the
Farmers’ Alliance and the People’s Party (Minneapolis, 1931); Hofstadter, The Age of Reform; Lawrence
Goodwyn, Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America (New York, 1976); Steven Hahn, The
Roots of Southern Populism: Yeomen Farmers and the Transformation of the Georgia Upcountry, 1850–
1890 (New York, 1983); Charles Postel, The Populist Vision (Oxford, 2007). Postel has persuasively ar-
gued that modernity itself was not in question for American populists. My goal is to further pursue this
line of interpretation and elaborate what precisely set the populist agenda apart from the reigning liberal
orthodoxy of this and later periods.
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reckless. Rather, they creatively and thoughtfully sought to translate economic priori-
ties and ideological commitments into policy. The delegates at these conventions did
not look back wistfully to a world without corporate power; nor were they shy about
their desire to spur development, which required the interregional financial investment
that corporations facilitated. Rather, they sought to structure the relationship with dis-
tant investors in ways that would harness eastern money in the service of their own
particular vision of a balanced regional economy.16
The West’s position as a periphery of the world economy, which made it depen-
dent on eastern financial resources, proved to be an immensely powerful counter-fac-
tor to these populist aspirations. As they moved to codify their own vision in the legal
foundations of the new states, constitution writers faced categorical demands from
the representatives of eastern investors, demands they found difficult to disregard.
Any deviation from prescribed policies, formulated according to the conventional
wisdom back east, threatened to jeopardize their community’s access to capital mar-
kets, with far-reaching economic consequences. Loath to cripple their prospects for
development, the delegates tended to err on the side of caution. The final drafts,
therefore, included meaningful achievements for the populist agenda but were never-
theless more deferential to the designs of eastern financiers than many participants
had initially hoped. Overall, the contentious dialogue pitting financial power brokers
from older cities on the Atlantic coast and their supporters against the populist chal-
lengers in the vast regions across the Mississippi defined the political economy of the
West, and of North America more broadly, in those formative decades.
ADAMS’S ARTICLE ON THE GRANGER LAWS characterized the migration of financial re-
sources to the West as a western endeavor. Appreciating the political power of narra-
tive structure, Adams attributed business initiative to the plucky westerners who
came east in search of capital for their less than judiciously conceived ventures. Their
tendency to succumb to “irrational exuberance,” to use modern-day parlance, ac-
counted in his mind for the period’s economic and political volatility. This trope con-
veniently concealed eastern financiers’ own relentless efforts to find profitable chan-
nels for financial investment out west. In the aftermath of the Civil War, with older
cotton-related manufacturing and commercial ventures no longer able to absorb addi-
tional savings, these efforts greatly accelerated. Interregional flows of capital were
therefore driven first and foremost not by the entrepreneurial initiative of ambitious
upstarts from the West, but by the imperatives of capital accumulation in the finan-
cial centers of the East. They were directed not by westerners knocking, hat in hand,
on the doors of financial firms on Wall Street in New York, State Street in Boston,
and Walnut Street in Philadelphia, but by affluent easterners’ own unceasing jour-
neying in the American West.17 These powerful men did not sit back and expect a
16 In essence, they resisted the thrust of the “great specialization” that gripped all world peripheries
in this period. See Findlay and O’Rourke, Power and Plenty, 411–414.
17 The overshadowed ability of accumulated wealth, particularly inherited wealth, to perpetuate itself
and even grow is a central theme in Thomas Piketty’s much-discussed Capital in the Twenty-First Century,
trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, Mass., 2014). See also Elizabeth Blackmar, “Inheriting Property
and Debt: From Family Security to Corporate Accumulation,” in Michael Zakim and Gary J. Kornblith,
eds., Capitalism Takes Command: The Social Transformation of Nineteenth-Century America (Chicago,
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modern corporate order to unfold; nor did they expect to realize their designs from
the comfort of the business districts back home. They crossed the continent numer-
ous times to observe development, gather information, and build networks of busi-
ness connections. Only gradually, as a result of their incessant work, did western
properties that had long been considered highly speculative and risky become more
common avenues for investment and mainstays in the portfolios of moneyed eastern
families.
Adams and his colleagues in Boston were a case in point. By the time he au-
thored his article on the Grangers, Adams himself was no stranger to the landscapes
of the West, having already made frequent trips to the region to study development
and forge business connections. Better known at the time as a government bureau-
crat, serving on the Massachusetts Railroad Commission, he nonetheless crossed the
continent twice and sometimes three times a year, traversing staggering distances
and turning up every spring and fall in places far and wide: Michigan, Illinois, Mis-
souri, Kansas, and beyond, to Colorado, Oregon, Idaho, Washington, Texas, and Cal-
ifornia.18 These journeys allowed him to regularly check the condition of a wide
range of properties—mining in Houghton and Marquette, real estate in Spokane and
Portland, railroads in Omaha and Cheyenne, stockyards in St. Joseph and Denver—
and to develop a detailed sense of economic change in all four corners of the conti-
nent. At times, Adams cruised in a private railroad car, enjoying breathtaking vistas,
often in the company of other powerful financiers from Boston such as Nathaniel
Thayer and Henry Lee Higginson. At other times, the Bostonian blueblood struggled
through “mud knee-deep” across “unspeakably dreary and disagreeable” landscapes.
In his personal notes, he ceaselessly complained about the “the tedium of [yet an-
other] journey” to the West, which “I fairly detest.”19 But ultimately, no written
source of information could supplant the power of firsthand knowledge, compelling
him and his colleagues to bear the taxing hardships of the road.
In addition to scouring the continent in search of investment outlets and reliable
information, Adams used these occasions to establish important bonds with eastern
transplants who had made new homes for themselves in the emerging West and
helped direct the flow of capital to the region. In Kansas City, which became a major
focal point for investment from New England, Adams found a reliable right-hand man
in Charles F. Morse, who had grown up modestly outside of Boston and attended Har-
vard’s Lawrence Scientific School. An ambitious individual, versed in eastern manners
and armed with the trust of Boston’s money men, Morse enjoyed good prospects out
2011), 93–117. In the case of Bostonians such as Adams, these earlier investments were primarily in tex-
tile manufacturing, which was an integral part of the cotton economy of the pre–Civil War United States.
I explore the transition away from cotton textiles in some detail in my Brahmin Capitalism: Frontiers of
Wealth and Populism in America’s First Gilded Age (Cambridge, Mass., 2017).
18 Adams traveled regularly throughout the West between 1870 and 1890. See Charles Francis Ad-
ams II, “Diary,” vols. 4–20, Charles Francis Adams (1835–1915) Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society
[hereafter MHS]. He traveled 18,000 miles over 72 days on one occasion, 20,000 over 100 days on another;
see entries for July 25, 1885, and September 15, 1889. On Adams’s career in business, see Edward C.
Kirkland, Charles Francis Adams Jr., 1835–1915: The Patrician at Bay (Cambridge, Mass., 1965); Paul
C. Nagel, “A West That Failed: The Dream of Charles Francis Adams II,” Western Historical Quarterly
18, no. 4 (1987): 397–407.
19 Charles Francis Adams II, “Diary,” vol. 11, entry for March 25, 1876, and vol. 20, entry for March
27, 1888, Adams Papers, MHS.
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west, and not due to superior technical training or management skills. The Bostonians
initially recruited Morse in 1872, summoning him to head to the mineral region of
Michigan, where they had already amassed substantial holdings.20 “We want someone
up there, who is more akin to us than those head workmen & mining captains pro-
moted, however good and able they may be,” Higginson wrote, courting his confidant
with an effective form of flattery.21 Morse’s allegiances dramatically came into play sev-
eral years later when, as the superintendent of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe
Railroad, he intrepidly upheld the company’s strict line against unions. During a labor
dispute in 1878, when members of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers—
“strikers and hoodlums,” as he later referred to them—occupied the railroad yards,
Morse called up two companies of the state militia to restore “normal conditions,”
then summarily discharged two-thirds of his workforce.22 For his firmness of purpose,
Morse was rewarded with a position as the general manager of the Kansas City Stock
Yards Company, of which Adams was president.
FIGURE 1: Portrait of Charles Francis Adams Jr. by Francis D. Millet, ca. 1876. Adams National Historical Park,
Quincy, Massachusetts.
20 William Bryam Gates, Michigan Copper and Boston Dollars: An Economic History of the Michigan
Copper Mining Industry (Cambridge, Mass., 1951).
21 Henry Lee Higginson to Charles F. Morse, July 20, 1872, Charles F. Morse Papers, MHS, Ms. N-
561, box 2, folder 15, 1870–1875.
22 Charles F. Morse, Superintendent of Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad, to “Engineers,”
April 4, 1878, Charles F. Morse Papers, MHS, Ms. N-561, box 2, folder 16, 1876–1878. See also Morse,
A Sketch of My Life Written for My Children (Cambridge, Mass., 1927), 40.
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Morse’s new position fruitfully entangled him in the meteoric rise of a regional
urban center that was utterly transformed by massive infusions of capital from the
East. The Kansas City Stock Yards Company, reorganized by Bostonian capitalists in
1876, made what had been a remote outpost into a gigantic hub for the livestock
trade and the packing industry.23 With Adams at the helm, the company purchased
dozens of acres of land, rerouted the railroad tracks, built pens and loading docks,
installed scales and sheds, and constructed a three-story exchange building, complete
with company offices, two banks, rental space for several dozen commission mer-
chants, a restaurant, a billiard hall, and a barbershop. The region’s scattered and
fluctuating cattle trade, conducted until then in makeshift fashion in railroad yards,
became a gushing flow through a state-of-the-art facility.24 Morse became involved in
all aspects of the industry, working diligently to cement Kansas City’s supremacy. He
launched and became president of the Livestock Exchange, which standardized and
regulated trade. He headed the Stock Yards Bank, which financed the commerce in
livestock. He then inaugurated the Kansas City Fat Stock Show Association, which
disseminated breeding and fattening techniques and established the city as a center
of livestock knowhow.25
This organizational foundation, bankrolled from the East, attracted the move-
ment of cattle, hogs, and sheep in ever-increasing numbers, reaching millions within
a few years.26 Beyond profitable revenues from renting yardage, selling feed, and col-
lecting fees from commission merchants, the yards generated a steady stream of traf-
fic for railroads. By 1880, the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe (directed, managed,
and owned almost entirely by Bostonians) became the undisputed leading carrier
into the yards. The livestock trade “made the road a paying concern,” one of the in-
dustry’s chroniclers accurately observed. It anchored the road’s rapid expansion from
Chicago to the Gulf Coast, to the Pacific shore in California, and deep into Mexico,
making it one of the great railroads in the United States.27 Next came meatpack-
ing, which was aggressively fostered by a set of incentives from Morse’s Livestock
Exchange—land, facilities, rail connections, and cash. The annual numbers were
again staggering and quickly climbing.28 The value of the product—almost $40 mil-
lion by 1890, $73 million by century’s end—accounted for 90 percent of the city’s in-
dustrial output.29 Finally, the growth of the city’s leading industry created a rapid in-
23 See Arthur M. Johnson and Barry E. Supple, Boston Capitalists and Western Railroads: A Study in
the Nineteenth-Century Railroad Investment Process (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), 92. Bostonian investors
chose Kansas City as a railroad hub (over the larger Leavenworth) because of its smaller and internally
cohesive cohort of businessmen. See Charles N. Glaab, Kansas City and the Railroads: Community Policy
in the Growth of a Regional Metropolis (Madison, Wis., 1962).
24 Eva Lash Atkinson, “Kansas City’s Livestock Trade and Packing Industry, 1870–1914: A Study in
Regional Growth” (Ph.D. diss., University of Kansas, 1971), 283.
25 Formed in 1883, 1884, and 1886, respectively. See Cuthbert Powell, Twenty Years of Kansas City’s
Live Stock Trade and Traders (Kansas City, Mo., 1893), 101, 107, 140.
26 The numbers of cattle, hogs, and sheep grew from 175,000, 150,000, and 175,000, respectively, in
1875 to 1.5 million, 2.8 million, and 1.5 million in 1890. Atkinson, “Kansas City’s Livestock Trade and
Packing Industry,” 328, 330.
27 Ibid., 344–345, 303.
28 Ibid., 355, 357. Kansas City remained behind Chicago (3.6 million head of cattle, 7.6 million hogs)
but well ahead of St. Louis (0.6 and 1.3) and Omaha (0.6 and 1.4).
29 Wilson J. Warren, Tied to the Great Packing Machine: The Midwest and Meatpacking (Iowa City,
2006), 207. See United States, Bureau of the Census, Twelfth Census of the United States Taken in the
Year 1900 (Washington, D.C., 1901), ccviii.
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crease in population, from less than 10,000 at the end of the war to more than
160,000 by 1900, which opened up a range of opportunities in urban development
that the Bostonians capitalized on. As Adams’s main representative in Missouri,
Morse spearheaded the development of the Metropolitan Street Railway Company
and coordinated many land purchases for eastern investors. After retiring in old age
to Boston, he explained that “these Boston people seemed to depend on my helping
them out,” which he was indeed in an excellent position to do.30
Overall, these types of close relationships between eastern financiers and trans-
plants such as Morse became part of the social infrastructure that facilitated the mi-
gration of capital to places like Chicago, Kansas City, St. Paul, and Denver. It was
then left to local boosters—men who were short on social pedigree and transregional
business connections but nonetheless staked their careers on the emerging system—
to talk up their own city’s special relationship with the East and leverage it to spur
FIGURE 2: The Kansas City Stock Yards, Kansas City, Kansas. Charles Adams was president of the company
from 1876 to 1902. From L. H. Everts & Co., The Official State Atlas of Kansas, Compiled from Government Sur-
veys, County Records and Personal Investigations (Philadelphia, 1887), opp. 241. David Rumsey Map Collection,
www.davidrumsey.com.
30 Morse, A Sketch of My Life, 62, 60. For documentation of Morse’s collaborations with Adams in
various real estate investments, see “CFA2 & JQA Kansas City Investments 1878–1887,” Adams Family
Office Papers, MHS. See also James R. Shortridge, Kansas City and How It Grew, 1822–2011 (Lawrence,
Kans., 2012), 77–80.
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further development. “The whole Capital of New York and New England supports
Chicago,” business advocates in Chicago liked to point out. “Though weak herself,
Chicago has found abundant strength in her unity of interest with the wealthiest re-
gion of our country.”31 Boosters in Kansas City did not stay far behind, noting that
their own city “suffers nothing in this respect by comparison with Chicago.” They
highlighted their tight relations with “some of the wealthiest and most conservative
capitalists in the country,” including Adams and Thayer.32 Further west, in Denver,
members of the Chamber of Commerce similarly realized that this was a real mo-
ment of opportunity. Cognizant of the “utmost difficulty in finding profitable invest-
ments” in the East, they deduced that a “‘plethora of money’ must seek employment
in the West where there [was] greater need, and naturally greater necessity for the
payment of a higher rate of interest.” “All the Eastern capital for which reasonably
safe and profitable employment can be found,” they confidently announced, “will be
sent here for that purpose.”33 This layered and hierarchical business network, which
connected eastern bankers, their transplanted representatives, and the topmost lead-
ership of western business communities, made it possible for money from the major
financial centers on the Atlantic to flow to the emerging regions of the Great West.
This financial axis propelled new industrial sectors into the core of American capital-
ism.
THE PENETRATION OF EASTERN CAPITAL into the Great West had implications that ex-
tended far beyond the realm of business, shaping American state formation in crucial
ways. As the investment frontier moved more deeply into the region, western settlers,
eager to position their communities in the emerging commercial system, began to
clamor for their territories to gain political autonomy as semi-sovereign states.34 The
integration of a national market has often appeared to be logically and necessarily
connected to the consolidation of a national authority, but in this context, it ener-
31 John S. Wright, Chicago: Past, Present, Future (Chicago, 1870), xv, quoted in Cronon, Nature’s
Metropolis, 82.
32 “Boston capital,” they announced, “is more closely identified with Kansas City than any other city
in the United States.” See Theodore S. Case, History of Kansas City, Missouri (Syracuse, N.Y., 1888), 393,
394.
33 Second Annual Report of the Denver Chamber of Commerce and Board of Trade, Denver, Colorado
(Denver, Colo., 1885), 7.
34 Howard R. Lamar’s enduring insight that Western territories sought to “escape federal tyranny by
entering the federal union, not by getting out of it” (as southern confederates had attempted to do) accu-
rately captured the contradictory nature of Western statehood movements. Lamar, Dakota Territory,
1861–1889: A Study of Frontier Politics (New Haven, Conn., 1956), 243. These constitutional debates like-
wise reveal the complex ideological and doctrinal backdrop against which Supreme Court laissez-faire ju-
risprudence developed. Richard Bensel’s exploration of the federal “judicial construction of the national
market” recognizes that, “[l]eft to their own devices, the legislatures of the individual states would have
erected significant barriers to the consolidation of the national market in the late nineteenth century,”
but does not take the efforts of these legislatures, and their notable successes, seriously enough; The
Political Economy of American Industrialization, 321. For a more thorough consideration of the possibili-
ties, but with overwhelming emphasis on federal institutions, see Gerald Berk, Alternative Tracks: The
Constitution of American Industrial Order, 1865–1917 (Baltimore, 1994). See also Gary Gerstle, “The
Resilient Power of the States across the Long Nineteenth Century: An Inquiry into a Pattern of Ameri-
can Governance,” in Lawrence Jacobs and Desmond King, eds., The Unsustainable American State (Ox-
ford, 2009), 61–87; William J. Novak, “Law and the Social Control of American Capitalism,” Emory Law
Journal 60, no. 2 (2010): 377–405.
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gized a proliferation of subnational political units, each in charge of large areas of
policy that the federal government had limited capacity and jurisdiction to attend
to.35 Instead of converging toward a seamless whole on the federal level, therefore,
the drive of market integration accelerated a contradictory trajectory of political frag-
mentation. This process began in the 1860s, as southern secession and unchallenged
Republican control of Congress prompted the rapid creation of U.S. territories, carv-
ing Dakota (1861) from parts of Minnesota and Nebraska; Colorado (1861) from
Kansas; and Idaho (1863), Montana (1864), and Wyoming (1868) from Washington,
which had itself at one point been part of Oregon.36 In the 1870s and 1880s, settlers
in those territories began to lobby for statehood. They expected each new state to
charter corporations, create a legal regime and a system of courts, and regulate in-
dustrial relations, establishing a robust governance structure for development.
As in other locales around the world at the time, the relationship between the
new states and corporate vehicles of financial investment raised a series of controver-
sial questions. Such controversies raged most visibly as the settler population of west-
ern territories, seeking statehood, assembled elected representatives in constitutional
conventions.37 These gatherings resembled one another in tone and content and can
thus be viewed together as part of a larger debate about the trajectory of the Ameri-
can political economy. This wide regional lens, rather than a discrete state-by-state
treatment, also better captures the complex intellectual tenor of the conversations. In
contrast to the federal constitutional convention, which brought together a cadre of
affluent elites behind closed doors, western conventions assembled a heterogeneous
mix of farmers, workers, miners, local lawyers, and small businessmen and were re-
ported on daily in the press. Farmers and laborers voiced the grievances of the re-
gion’s working population. They placed on the agenda a wide spectrum of policy
ideas, beyond the scope of what was admissible in more polite circles back east. In
the context of these western gatherings, however, these policy ideas had a broad base
of support, even among more upwardly mobile and formally educated delegates.
Many in attendance thus dissented from market dictates, reflecting pervasive senti-
ments among the settler population. They openly expressed hostility toward corpora-
tions that were controlled not by the local political authorities that had initially char-
tered them, but by “foreign” shareholders back east. They looked for ways to priori-
tize actual settlers over distant investors. Against the financiers’ aspirations to shape
policy with an integrated economy in mind, the conventions advanced democratic
processes over financial imperatives and relative regional autonomy over the prerog-
atives of the national market.
35 The federal government, of course, was not altogether absent from the region and flexed its long
muscles to assert U.S. sovereignty, map the territory, survey natural resources, and make war against in-
digenous nations. See most notably White, “It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own,” and Steven
Hahn, A Nation without Borders: The United States and Its World in an Age of Civil Wars, 1830–1910 (New
York, 2016).
36 Eager for state institutions, settlers often formed self-proclaimed territorial governments in antici-
pation of federal legislation. The Denver area, for example, had no fewer than three different bodies
claiming jurisdiction prior to the official establishment of Colorado Territory in February 1861. See Dale
A. Oesterle and Richard B. Collins, The Colorado State Constitution: A Reference Guide (Westport,
Conn., 2002), 3–4.
37 The following territories gained statehood status in the years after the Civil War: Nebraska
(1867), Colorado (1875), Montana (1888), North Dakota (1889), South Dakota (1889), Washington
(1889), Idaho (1890), and Wyoming (1890).
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The participants’ distinctly regional outlook did not mean that the conversations
were somehow parochial or insular. Having themselves moved between regions and
between various western settlements, they developed a sophisticated and varied pur-
view that was informed by their own migratory experience. Fully aware of a large
economic transformation underway across the continent, they routinely drew com-
parisons between their own territories and other locales. They freely adopted provi-
sions from the constitutions of other states and frequently invoked lessons learned in
places such as Pennsylvania, Illinois, Wisconsin, California, and Nevada. The inter-
section of the delegates’ diverse perspectives infused the deliberative process with a
sense of possibility. The law, many reasoned, was not derived from immutable and
unchanging abstract principles. Rather, it emerged from the everyday practices and
collective wisdom of the settlers. William Stewart, a senator from Nevada who ad-
dressed several of the conventions, underscored that the law was “simply a system of
principles to be applied to the facts as they are developed.” Constitutional conven-
tions should therefore readily welcome pragmatic innovation and a measure of juris-
prudential pluralism, resting on “such application of the facts as they exist in the dif-
ferent localities as will inure to the greatest good of the people.”38 This view was
shared by many of the delegates, who proceeded to shape policy not in accordance
with any established doctrine, but with conditions on the ground in mind.
This approach flew in the face of legal orthodoxy at the time. Expert authorities
urged the settlers to follow the federal model and write short and elegant constitu-
tions that would outline a general legal framework. Thomas M. Cooley, chief justice
of the Michigan Supreme Court and the era’s most prominent scholar of constitu-
tional law, spoke at several of the conventions and implored the delegates to confine
themselves to fundamental principles. “Leave what properly belongs to the field of
legislation, to the Legislature of the future,” he pleaded.39 Most participants, how-
ever, felt that in the absence of a detailed constitutional framework, state legislatures
would be too vulnerable to corporate manipulation. The members of the Colorado
convention, in a joint address to the people of the territory, explained that legisla-
tures “have, in most cases, been found unequal to the task of preventing abuses and
protecting the people from the grasping and monopolizing tendencies of railroads
and other corporations.”40 Melville C. Brown, a Maine native who had migrated to
Wyoming via California and Idaho, warned that any important policy issues left out
of the constitution would permit corporations to shape legislation in their best inter-
ests. “As you have seen in the past men elected to our legislatures wearing the brass
collars of the great railroad corporation,” he cautioned, “you will see just such men
wear the brass collars of the great monied mining corporations.” The constitution,
38 Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention Held in the City of Helena, Montana, July
4th, 1889, August 17th, 1889 (Helena, Mont., 1921), 806.
39 Journal of the Constitutional Convention for North Dakota Held at Bismarck, Thursday, July 4 to
Aug. 17, 1889, Together with the Enabling Act of Congress and the Proceedings of the Joint Commission
Appointed for the Equitable Division of Territorial Property (Bismarck, N.D., 1889), 67.
40 “Probably no subject” in their deliberations, they explained, produced “more anxiety and concern
than the troublesome and vexed question pertaining to corporations.” Proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention Held in Denver December 20, 1875: To Frame a Constitution for the State of Colorado, Together
with the Enabling Act Passed by the Congress of the United States and Approved March 3, 1875, the Address
to the People Issued by the Convention, the Constitution as Adopted and the President’s Proclamation (Den-
ver, Colo., 1907), 728.
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therefore, should explicitly “limit the action of the legislature” with regard to some
policy issues, placing them “forever beyond reach.”41 These apprehensions about cor-
porate power encouraged the delegates at the conventions to author long constitu-
tions that carefully delineated the authority of state governments, demanding direct
state involvement in some spheres and firmly limiting it in others.
The question of water and its distribution called for particularly creative treatment.
The common-law doctrine of riparian rights practiced in the East, which bestowed wa-
ter rights to the owner of the adjacent land, was inadequate in the arid West, where
sources of water were few and far between. If settlers were to enjoy wide access to wa-
ter, water rights had to extend to non-riparians. The alternative doctrine of “prior ap-
propriation,” giving ownership to the first mover who diverted water from its natural
source, presented its own pitfalls and was similarly questioned. Charles Burritt, a Ver-
monter who had practiced law in Michigan before settling in Wyoming, declared that
“[w]hen a man builds a ditch and takes out water he has not the right against his coun-
try and all the world to the use of that water as long as he pleases.”42 More threatening
than individual users gaining disproportionate amounts of water was the fear that cor-
porations, which had the financial resources to construct canals and ditches, would cre-
ate water monopolies and subjugate the rest of the population. George W. Fox, who
was raised in Ohio and had lived in Iowa and Montana before opening a hardware
store in Laramie, pointed out that in the absence of countervailing legislation, “a corpo-
ration may organize a strong company to take out nearly all the water in a stream . . . ,
and . . . prevent the settlers . . . from obtaining water out of this canal.”43
To address this challenge in a region where access to water could be provided
only via heavy investment in infrastructure, several delegates voiced well-reasoned
support for state ownership of water and water infrastructure. Alexander Burns, a
Missourian prospector-turned-farmer who had settled in Montana, boldly proposed
that “the legislature shall provide for the construction and maintenance of a system
of irrigating canals and ditches in this state,” which would then “belong forever to
the state, and remain under its direct control.”44 Given that the new states lacked the
resources to build this infrastructure, others proposed more realistic measures that
would charter private companies to carry out the construction but would maintain
that all water in the state was public property.45 This approach granted corporations
the right to charge regulated rates for delivery of water, but not to hoard and monop-
olize this precious resource. It also allowed the state to regulate how water would be
distributed, attenuating the principle of “prior appropriation” with constitutional
provisions restricting the allocation of water rights according to the principles of
“beneficial use” and “sufficiency.” These provisions limited the right to water to the
41 Journal and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Wyoming Begun at the City of
Cheyenne on September 2, 1889, and Concluded September 30, 1889 (Cheyenne, Wyo., 1893), 668; Ichabod
S. Bartlett, History of Wyoming, 3 vols. (Chicago, 1918), 3: 102–105.
42 Journal and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Wyoming, 498; Marie H. Erwin,
Wyoming Historical Blue Book: A Legal and Political History of Wyoming, 1868–1943 (Denver, Colo.,
1946), 642.
43 Journal and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Wyoming, 295.
44 Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention . . . of . . . Montana, 61; “Capt. Alexander
F. Burns,” in Progressive Men of the State of Montana (Chicago, 1900), 57–58.
45 Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention . . . of . . . Montana, 137; The Journal of
the Washington State Constitutional Convention, 1889 (Seattle, Wash., 1962), 203.
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amount one put to actual use, and required that water be divided up in dry seasons
to ensure each user an adequate amount. William H. Claggett, a Maryland-born law-
yer who had practiced in Nevada and Montana before migrating to Idaho, clarified
that these clauses aimed to promote a more “equitable distribution”—to serve “the
greatest good to the greatest number, bearing in mind constantly the fact of the prior
right of the first man as well as the necessities of the second.”46
Some delegates thought that declaring water everywhere to be public property
was too radical. Walter Cooper, a dealer in mining properties and real estate who
was raised in Michigan and had arrived in Montana after spending time in Kansas
and Colorado, protested that “if this amendment had emanated from that distin-
guished person, [the heterodox political economist] Henry George . . . I would not
have been surprised.” Llewellyn Luce, a New Englander who had moved to Montana
on behalf of the Department of the Interior, similarly argued for the commodifica-
tion of water: “a right to use water,” he claimed, “is just as much property as is a
horse, for instance, and it would be just about as consistent for us to declare in this
FIGURE 3: Members of the Wyoming Constitutional Convention on the steps of the Capitol Building, 1889. Wyo-
ming’s constitution made it the first state to enfranchise women and grant male and female citizens equal civil,
political, and religious rights. Wyoming State Archives, Department of State Parks and Cultural Resources.
46 Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of Idaho, 1889, ed. and annotated by
I. W. Hart, 2 vols. (Caldwell, Idaho, 1912), 2: 1181. “There may be in ordinary years enough water to
supply all of the people that settle along a ditch or canal,” Claggett said in explaining the principle of
“sufficiency,” “but when there comes a dry season, is one-half of the farms to be absolutely destroyed be-
cause the other man has an absolute priority, or is there to be an equitable distribution under such rules
and regulations as may be provided by law?” (1162).
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Constitution that every horse in the State should be the property of the State.”47
Most delegates, however, agreed that a failure to depart from precedent on this issue
would result in an intolerable situation that would be incompatible with republican
institutions. Without the proper constitutional protections, Martin Maginnis, born in
New York and raised in Minnesota, a miner who became the editor of the Helena
Daily, foresaw that “[t]he men who hold the water . . . [would] practically own the
country,” leading to “a system of landlordism in contrast with which the evils of all
other systems of landlordism will be as nothing.”48
Industrial relations in the new states similarly attracted the full attention of the
conventions. Clear-eyed about the region’s large industries, railroads and mining in
particular, delegates foresaw the intensification of class conflict. They anticipated, as
Claggett explained in Idaho, that the “great development of the material resources”
of their territories would bring about “problems of a very difficult nature relating to
labor in its various forms of employment and various exactions that may be imposed
upon it.”49 The conventions thus discussed a long list of labor protections that placed
the power of the state firmly behind workers. They considered clauses mandating
government oversight of workers’ safety, eight-hour workdays, minimum age require-
ments, labor bureaus to study and publicize industrial conditions, employers’ liability
for injuries, restrictions on the use of convict and contractual labor to compete with
free labor, and a prohibition on the blacklisting of labor “agitators.”50
Particularly controversial in this context were proposed bans on the use of armed
Pinkerton detectives by management during strikes, an issue that was bound up in
the question of workers’ right to organize. Peter Breen, who was born in Kansas and
raised in Illinois before finding work as a locomotive fireman in Colorado, Idaho,
and Montana, argued that this provision was absolutely urgent. “[W]e do not want
any such class of men as makes up the standing armies in Chicago today to go to any
part of the Union where they can be at the call of corporations,” he explained. These
men “did not come as soldiers, or as officers of the law interested in the welfare of
the Territory”; rather, “they came at the bidding of some corporation, that, for a
monetary consideration, wishes to crush the manhood of the people of the Terri-
tory.”51 Others agreed that in a free society, workers should be able to organize with-
out the threat of violence. No corporation, declared William T. Fields, a locomotive
engineer who had arrived from Illinois, had “the right or power to employ armed
bodies of men to shoot down people who assemble and congregate for the purposes
of freedom.” This use of private militias created, in effect, “a despotic form of gov-
ernment” that kept workers in a state of “chattle slavery.”52
47 Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention . . . of . . . Montana, 896; “Walter Coo-
per,” in Progressive Men of the State of Montana, 440–442; “Llewellyn Augustus Luce,” ibid., 281–283.
Luce had come to Montana on behalf of the federal government to negotiate with the Crow Indians for
the Northern Pacific Railroad’s right of way.
48 Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention . . . of . . . Montana, 498.
49 Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of Idaho, 2: 1373–1374.
50 The Journal of the Washington State Constitutional Convention, 297–301; Proceedings and Debates
of the Constitutional Convention of Idaho, 2: 1372–1395; Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional
Convention . . . of . . . Montana, 196–217; Journal of the Constitutional Convention for North Dakota, 366–
371.
51 Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention . . . of . . . Montana, 130; “Peter Breen,” in
Progressive Men of the State of Montana, 62.
52 Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention . . . of . . . Montana, 129, 146, 140.
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Again, as with water, these types of restrictions on the prerogatives of corporate
property prompted fierce opposition. Francis Sargent, who was making his way in
the mining industry in Montana, announced that it represented “an abridgment of
my rights and privileges, guaranteed to me by the [federal] Constitution, if I cannot,
at my discretion, within the law, call upon the sixty millions of people within the
United States, if necessary, to preserve my life and property.”53 This line of reasoning
gained little traction with the other delegates, who were far from eager to further
militarize their region. Elliot Morgan, who had moved to Wyoming from his native
Pennsylvania, where labor conflicts involving Pinkertons had already erupted, ex-
plained that the importation of “armed men . . . clothed with authority of law” was
“one of the greatest outrages ever perpetrated upon any people.”54 Even more con-
servative delegates like Luce agreed that government should protect private prop-
erty, not private militias.55
One common-law tradition to which the delegates held fast affirmed the suprem-
acy of the state over chartered corporations. Martin N. Johnson, a farmer in North
Dakota, explained that “railroads are quasi public institutions. [Their shareholders]
don’t own their roads as we own our ox carts. They must run their roads in the inter-
est of the public—they cannot stop these arteries of commerce, and deprive the hus-
bandman of the fruits of his labor.” Citing the case of Munn vs. Illinois, Johnson re-
minded his fellow delegates that the United States Supreme Court itself had “settled
that principle once [and] for all.”56 This decision validated delegates’ efforts to en-
dow state legislatures with far-reaching regulatory powers over corporations, includ-
ing the right to set freight rates. It sanctioned constitutional provisions that repealed
or altered existing corporate charters and declared railroads to be “public highways
and common carriers,” prohibiting the practice of discriminatory rates that gave
high-volume shippers and select cities favorable rates over other shippers and other
locales.
The debate surrounding the rights and privileges of corporations in the new states
became especially contentious as delegates sought to constrict the tax exemptions
and subsidies that corporations sought and in some cases already enjoyed. Idaho
judge John T. Morgan protested against the lax tax regime under the territorial au-
thorities. A “vast amount of money [in the mining industry] has been taken out of
this territory and almost no taxes have been paid upon it at all,” he argued. Mines
were difficult to assess for a more conventional property tax, so he proposed a tax on
the net proceeds of mining properties. Since the owners were “becoming wealthy”
and using the money “to build up mansions and rich homes” back east, “in Boston
and New York and other places,” he believed that they should “pay some little trib-
ute to the government of the state.”57 Others advocated strict limits on direct govern-
53 Ibid., 143.
54 Journal and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Wyoming, 402; Erwin, Wyoming
Historical Blue Book, 172.
55 Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention . . . of . . . Montana, 142. The Wyoming
convention collectively heralded this “prohibiting of the importation of foreign police to usurp local au-
thority” as one of its most important achievements. Journal and Debates of the Constitutional Convention
of the State of Wyoming, 119.
56 Journal of the Constitutional Convention for North Dakota, 380.
57 Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of Idaho, 2: 1708, 1709.
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ment subsidies to corporations. Thomas C. Griffitts, a printer who had arrived in
Washington via Illinois and Utah, curried favor with his proposal that “[n]o county,
city or other municipal corporation shall give any subsidy or loan its credit in any
way whatever for any purpose to any corporation, company, association or person.”58
The representatives of the mining, stock-raising, and railroad industries maintained
that tax incentives and public subsidies were absolutely necessary. Alfred Myers, a
Montana stock grower who originally hailed from Illinois, explained that the con-
struction of water infrastructure was not remunerative, making government subsidies
“necessary, in order to induce people to invest money in this kind of speculation.”59
Lycurgus Vineyard, a former superintendent of schools in Oregon, argued that if a
tax on the proceeds of the territory’s “languishing” mines were to be added, “You
might as well close them out, these enterprising mining men who are seeking to de-
velop this industry.”60
The notion that the region’s largest industries needed nurturing in their fledgling
phase seemed plausible in the context of competition among states, where any extra
costs threatened to put one’s own state at a disadvantage. Louis J. Palmer, a county
attorney who was originally from Illinois, explained that taxing extracted minerals
would “destroy” Wyoming’s mining interests, “for they cannot compete with the Col-
orado men, if you are going to put a tariff on coal.”61 Most delegates nonetheless ob-
jected to these special favors. If the corporations received tax relief, asked William
Parberry, a Montana doctor and rancher who was born in Kentucky and raised on a
farm in Missouri, then “why in the name of justice cannot a man who is trying to
make a living by the sweat of his brow”?62 Alexander Mayhew, a dealer in mining
claims who had come to Idaho by way of Kansas, Colorado, and Montana, similarly
spoke against “sacrificing everything in this territory for the purpose of building up
these corporations.” It was “a dangerous precedent,” he said, “to establish in this ter-
ritory as we are now budding into statehood, to encourage the railroads in such man-
ner.”63 These sentiments lent support to forceful constitutional provisions that stripped
legislatures of the authority to grant corporations special giveaways.
As the various conventions appeared intent on passing significant checks on the
power of corporations in the new states, in a range of policy areas, it fell upon local
compradors—men who had forged relationships with eastern financiers and were
therefore attuned to the vitality of interregional investment—to articulate the force-
ful retort. And indeed, these stewards of eastern financial interests worked tirelessly
to resist the conventions’ populist tide. They of course harbored no enmity against
58 The Journal of the Washington State Constitutional Convention, 41.
59 Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention . . . of . . . Montana, 553.
60 Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of Idaho, 2: 1716, 1715; Dennis C. Col-
son, Idaho’s Constitution: The Tie That Binds (Moscow, Idaho, 1991), 10.
61 Journal and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Wyoming, 684. Comparisons to
other states at times supported the opposite conclusions, emboldening delegates to take a harder stand vis-
a-vis corporate power. As Mayhew argued in Idaho, in anything relating to corporations, “it is best for us
to follow some of the examples of other states” and “territories now forming” and adopt “such provisions
in constitutions of this character, in order to protect the people against these institutions.” Proceedings and
Debates of the Constitutional Convention of Idaho, 2: 1069.
62 Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention . . . of . . . Montana, 569; “Dr. William
Parberry,” in Progressive Men of the State of Montana, 1176–1178.
63 Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of Idaho, 1: 889; Colson, Idaho’s Consti-
tution, 9.
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state institutions per se. They fully agreed that economic development could not pro-
ceed without adequate government institutions and wise public policy. Indeed, they
interpreted the entire statehood movement as an effective way to attract investment.
Mark Hopkins, a Pennsylvanian who had spent time in Colorado and Utah before
heading to Wyoming as the superintendent of the mines of the Union Pacific Rail-
road, said that he had “taken it for granted that one of the benefits to be derived
from statehood” was the improved ability “to bring outside capital into this state, to
develop the latent interests of this territory.” Frederick H. Harvey, a lawyer who was
raised in Iowa and educated in New York before arriving in Wyoming, said similarly,
“we are advocating statehood in order to bring in just as many corporations as we
can possibly.”64
What these spokesmen on behalf of finance mostly objected to was not robust
government institutions as such, but the notion that economic policy was the prov-
ince of democratic politics. Illinois-born Francis Henry, former clerk of the Territo-
rial Supreme Court in Washington, explained that an elected railroad commission
with rate-setting authority would be incompatible with liberal institutions. He re-
jected such a body as “discriminating, arbitrary and unjust in the extreme, and in vio-
lation of the fundamental principles of free government.”65 The forging of govern-
ment policies, these men posited, should ultimately be determined not by a popular
vote, but by educated experts and in accordance with universal laws. They were dis-
missive of provisions such as state regulation of workers’ hours and public ownership
of water, which threatened to endow what they considered to be ludicrous economic
doctrines with firm legal standing. John W. Hoyt, an Ohioan who had previously
served as the appointed governor of Wyoming Territory, argued that such policies
were opposed to “the great economic law that has commanded the respect of all
statesmen of every land.”66 These “great” principles stood high above any policy that
the people’s elected representatives could devise.
Regardless of the people’s preferences or ideological commitments, these de-
fenders of corporate prerogatives proposed, the ultimate costs of ignoring the univer-
sal laws of political economy would forever outweigh the benefits. Any imposition on
the rights of investors would be counterproductive, as it threatened to drive capital
away and retard future development. This concern about alarming capital crystallized
the key dilemma at the very core of those constitutional deliberations, one that came
up time and again, in every state and around nearly every question of economic sig-
nificance. With this dilemma at hand, the compradors dangled an alluring “carrot.”
William A. Clark, a banker and speculator in mining, among the wealthiest men in
Montana, shared with the convention what was well-known in elite business circles.
Declining profit margins back east and in Europe, he explained—the “very low rate
of interest” resulting from “the great accumulation of capital in foreign countries”—
had created a real opportunity for the fledgling states to become the next focal points
for massive investment. Instead of deterring them, wise legislation should “induce
[these capitalists] to come here and build large smelting plants and large mills and
64 Journal and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Wyoming, 691, 453; “Mark
Hopkins,” in Progressive Men of the State of Wyoming (Chicago, 1903), 840–841.
65 The Journal of the Washington State Constitutional Convention, 188 (quote), 475.
66 Journal and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Wyoming, 672.
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other enterprises of that kind.”67 Hoyt similarly dazzled his fellow delegates in
Wyoming. “We have extraordinary resources, thirty thousand square miles of coal,
endless soda lakes, inexhaustible supplies of oil, mountains of iron that have not yet
begun to be developed,” he waxed poetic. “What we want is capital, and shall we not
keep out capital if we discourage capitalists? Shall we build a Chinese wall around
Wyoming and prevent the investor from coming in to develop its resources?”68 Instead
of creating a heavy-handed regulatory apparatus, exacting taxes, and empowering la-
bor, the top priority should be to forge an effective framework for money to pour in
from the East and produce broad-based prosperity.
When participants seemed unmoved by these alluring prospects, doubting that
wealth would trickle down to the general population, the same spokesmen pulled out
the “stick.” Sounding the alarm, they warned that unfriendly policies toward inves-
tors would unquestionably derail the economic trajectory of states in which they were
adopted. Railroad regulation, Francis Henry warned in Washington, would thwart
“the investment of capital in the development of the resources of the state . . . para-
lyze the great enterprises of improvement which have already been commenced, and
. . . prevent the inauguration of others now in contemplation.”69 A tax on mine pro-
ceeds in Idaho, Vineyard announced, would deter capitalists, who would channel
their money to other, friendlier locales. You could very well “tear down your adver-
tisement to the world that you invite mining men and mine operators into this terri-
tory, and tell them that they need not apply.”70 Similarly, Anthony C. Campbell, who
had moved from Pennsylvania to Cheyenne as the U.S. attorney for the Territory of
Wyoming, then served as the attorney for the Denver and Rio Grande Railroad
Company and Standard Oil, explained that employers’ liability for injuries would
prove ruinous, making it “impossible for any railroad company or any corporation to
do business . . . without going into absolute bankruptcy.”71
Constitutional delegates responded to these confident arguments in mixed and
contradictory ways. Some believed that these doomsday scenarios were vastly over-
blown. Others objected to corporate encroachment into the domain of political sov-
ereignty, to corporations that would “come in and bind us hand and foot,” as
Mayhew put it.72 Several speakers defiantly rejected the very notion that the state, as
Charles Hartman, a lawyer who had come to Montana from Indiana, phrased it, had
to “coddle and fondle and caress these great capitalists in order to get them to come
out here and invest their money.”73 Nonetheless, the threat of alarmed capital fleeing
their states weakened the resolve of constitution writers on these issues. Not eager to
confront powerful financial interests, many delegates conceded their territory’s posi-
tion of weakness. Jack H. Beatty, an Ohioan by birth who had previously practiced
law in Missouri and Utah, spoke as an insider when he plainly explained, “[Y]ou in-
67 Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention . . . of . . . Montana, 127; “William A.
Clark,” in Progressive Men of the State of Montana, 1104–1109.
68 Journal and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Wyoming, 672.
69 The Journal of the Washington State Constitutional Convention, 189.
70 Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of Idaho, 2: 1743.
71 Journal and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Wyoming, 443; Erwin, Wyoming
Historical Blue Book, 632.
72 Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of Idaho, 1: 888.
73 Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention . . . of . . . Montana, 677.
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vite eastern capitalists to come in here and build railroads, and they will commence
to look over your laws. The first thing they will find is that we have adopted stringent
measures to operate their roads for them.” Given “how timid capital is,” this would
prove disastrous.74 Walter A. Burleigh, a lawyer from Maine, led the retreat in Mon-
tana: “we are not working for the nabobs of the east, we are not working for the lords
of England; we are not working for the capitalists of New England,” he reasoned,
and yet “we do not want to hedge around the development of our resources by any
such strict rules of conduct either moral or business.”75 As the deliberations pro-
ceeded, these concerns led to the elimination of some of the more restrictive provi-
sions, making the constitutions less radical.76
WHAT, IN MORE GENERAL TERMS, was at stake in these constitutional debates? Beyond
the realm of any particular policy question, and beyond the scope of a contest among
different interest groups, the conventions revealed conflict over three fundamental
and deeply interrelated issues: distribution, legibility, and spatiality. On the most ba-
sic and obvious level, the contests were driven by an effort to determine how material
resources would be distributed between employers and employees and between for-
eign investors and settlers. This was part of a general contest in this period among
what Richard Bensel has termed competing “claims on wealth.”77 Inherent in the
constitution-writing process was the premise that the structure of state institutions,
and their relationship to private interests, would ultimately determine how the mate-
rial bounty of the land would be divided. Delegates were deeply worried about the
emergence of a society that would be sharply polarized between rich and poor, a situ-
74 Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of Idaho, 1: 885.
75 Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention . . . of . . . Montana, 704.
76 Newspaper coverage readily observed this dynamic. Commenting on the convention in Washington,
the Seattle Times noted that “while the corporation article was being considered . . . there was great hue
and cry raised about the necessity of giving encouragement to capital seeking investment in this state, and
the specious plea was made and made often, that any restraint upon corporations would be an injury to
capital. It was under this cloak that the corporation tools in the convention did their work, and endeav-
ored, by exhibiting a tender interest in the welfare of capital, to defeat those clauses particularly obnox-
ious to their masters. They succeeded in pulling wool over the eyes of some of the delegates—perhaps
because they did not particularly object to being deluded.” “A Sensible Suggestion,” Seattle Times, August
7, 1889. When delegates themselves failed to meet corporate expectations, outside lobbying occasionally
came into play. After the delegates in Washington voted to create a powerful railroad commission, the
territory’s business groups snapped into action. In the days after the decision, they overwhelmed the con-
vention with a barrage of petitions. The Boards of Trade of Yakima and Ellensburg moved first to cast
the railroad commission as “inimical to the best interests of our state,” particularly to the “speedy devel-
opment of our resources by . . . foreign capital.” The Boards of Trade of Spokane Falls, Aberdeen, Monte-
sano, and Vancouver then joined the chorus with their own petitions to protect “the liberty of contract,”
calling for the new article to be “in letter, and spirit . . . entirely expunged,” alongside any other article
that would “tend to alarm and drive away the capital so greatly needed at this time.” When the question
was again brought before the convention several days later, a dozen of the delegates had changed their
votes, and the commission initiative was struck down. See the “The Regulation of Corporations to Be
Left for the Legislature,” Tacoma Morning Globe, August 3, 1889. On the petitions from Yakima and
Aberdeen, see The Journal of the Washington State Constitutional Convention, 192, 214. After winning
thirty-nine votes in favor on August 3, 1889, the commission was brought up for another vote on August
6, losing by a vote of twenty-three to forty-seven. See “Whether or Not to Establish a Railroad Commis-
sion the Absorbing Topic” and “Kinnear’s ‘Section 21’ Finally Succumbs,” Tacoma Morning Globe,
August 4 and 6, 1889.
77 Bensel, The Political Economy of American Industrialization, 15.
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ation they deemed incompatible with a free society. It was with these concerns in
mind that they promoted a legal code that prioritized “beneficial use” of resources
like water and allocated them broadly according to principles such as “sufficiency.”
The distribution of these resources was not to be governed by the ostensibly objective
laws of supply and demand, but rather, as Montana Territory justice Hiram Knowles
put it, according to “what was reasonable.”78 The same distributional goals similarly
motivated delegates to regulate the exploitative tendencies of the labor market, em-
power workers to mobilize collectively, and tax corporate property.
Delegates, however, were not concerned merely with how wealth would be di-
vided, but much more fundamentally with how the modern political economy would
be organized and governed. The different parties to the conversation were not just
battling over the distribution of economic rewards; they thought of development in
radically different terms. This came up during persistent skirmishes over the compre-
hensibility of the emerging state institutions, or their “legibility,” to apply James C.
Scott’s apt term in a particularly broad way.79 Corporate investors were not merely
immensely affluent, and therefore a target of wealth redistribution; they were also
absentee owners who shipped their capital across the continent. These capitalists
wanted the property regime to be not only secure but also predictable and transpar-
ent, especially from afar. Local farmers had full confidence in an institutional frame-
work governed by democratically elected officials who were answerable directly to
the residents of their state. They wanted railroad freight rates and water rights to be
allocated, as Maginnis put it in Montana, by “a tribunal that was near the people . . .
[and] elected by the people.”80 From an absentee investor’s perspective, this was a
nonstarter. As Luce explained to his peers, “people do not let their money out from
a distance. They will not bring it here or send it here to be controlled by County
Commissioners” or other locally controlled bodies.81 A democratic process that ap-
peared to be most reliable and accountable to the farmers in the region seemed ut-
78 Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention . . . of . . . Montana, 899. In Idaho,
Mayhew similarly appealed to “reason,” arguing that “corporations should be in some measure checked,
that is to say, to hold them within the bounds of reason.” Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional
Convention of Idaho, 1: 817. Ironically, it is precisely this embrace of “reason” that earned westerners’ re-
buke from Adams for being “deaf to reason.”
79 On “legibility” as a central problem in modern statecraft, see James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State:
How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven, Conn., 1998). Battles
over legibility are the macro-level political analogue of the struggles for workers’ control of the produc-
tion floor. See David Montgomery, Workers’ Control in America: Studies in the History of Work, Technology,
and Labor Struggles (Cambridge, 1979); Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor: The Workplace, the
State, and American Labor Activism, 1865–1925 (Cambridge, 1987).
80 Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention . . . of . . . Montana, 899.
81 Ibid., 504. The issue of taxation, if administered by local assessors, introduced a similar element of
“uncertainty.” As Beatty pointed out in Idaho, “If you put that kind of a tax on the mines, you give the
eastern capitalist to understand that the surface ground of their mines is exactly in the power of the as-
sessors of the state. How many eastern men are coming out here to invest their money in property that
will be so uncertain as that?” Claggett likewise warned about the consequences of an absence of “a fixed
and certain fiscal policy with regard to . . . taxation . . . if you simply leave the whole matter to be the foot-
ball of the legislative session, there is never anybody who will ever know two years in advance as to what
the laws with regard to mining property are going to be . . . [This] will be a terrible discouragement to the
investment of capital.” Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of Idaho, 2: 1750, 1763.
Elizabeth Sanders has emphasized the significance of social movements’ preference for legislative versus
administrative state power run by experts. See Sanders, Roots of Reform: Farmers, Workers, and the Amer-
ican State, 1877–1917 (Chicago, 1999), 387–389.
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terly indecipherable to distant investors and their representatives. These investors
viewed the democratic political process as an arbitrary infringement on the more pre-
dictable laws of political economy and the methodical workings of the private market.
As legal scholar David Schorr has shown in relation to Colorado, the entire legal
notion of “beneficial use” resulted in what investors considered an illegible property
regime that placed significant restrictions on the easy transfer and sale of water
rights. Unlike rights based on the physical capacity of each ditch to carry water,
which remained constant, rights based on use fluctuated with rainfall and the precise
acreage of land under irrigation. These rights were also always set to expire due to
the failure to put water to use. Investors under this system could not hold on to water
rights while blocking bona fide settlers. Nor could they shift rights from one type of
use to another. All transfers rested on the ability to demonstrate conclusively that
the quantity of water passed over had indeed been used for a particular purpose by
the seller prior to sale. Any precise measure of this amount required litigation in lo-
cally controlled state courts, which affirmed the scope of one’s entitlement on a case-
by-case basis. To complicate things further, any given water stream had dozens of up-
stream and downstream users whose intertwined rights, which were not recorded in
any central registry, could not be legally interfered with.82
Needless to say, in reducing the clarity and certainty of property rights, this no-
tion of “beneficial use” did not make for easy alienability of water. Crucially, this re-
gime tended to privilege settlers over absentee investors. Local users, embedded in
this dense thicket of arrangements, enjoyed a clear advantage over prospective buyers
from outside the region, who had little chance to make sense of it, let alone navigate
it.83 Scholars, including Scott, have associated this type of illegibility with pre-modern
or pre-capitalist modes of governance. This particular legal framework, however, de-
veloped through legal decisions in territorial courts and later codified in state constitu-
tions, was not a vestige of an earlier age but a distinctly modern edifice, driven by the
aspirations of western settlers for dynamic commercial development. It nevertheless
introduced highly contextual standards that were relatively transparent for local actors
while remaining opaque to eastern investors.
Finally, again transcending mere issues of distribution, the question of organizing
space—what Richard White has labeled “spatial politics”—became a key theme in
the constitutional debates.84 The struggle to shape the emergent, and extremely un-
stable, geography of the modern political economy was central to the politics of the
era overall. Westerners were not concerned about the volatility of the geography
around them per se. Having themselves migrated time and time again, adroitly tra-
versing across and within regions, they were quintessential modern actors who
thrived in the flux of their dynamic environment. Unlike more elite investors and
82 David Schorr, The Colorado Doctrine: Water Rights, Corporations, and Distributive Justice on the
American Frontier (New Haven, Conn., 2012), chap. 5. According to Schorr, the effort to create a clear reg-
istry of water rights in later years was invalidated by the state supreme court precisely for its violation of
these established use rights. Beatty commented on this feature of “beneficial use” in Idaho. “[T]he main
objection,” he explained, was that it made “all interests uncertain.” Proceedings and Debates of the Constitu-
tional Convention of Idaho, 2: 1118.
83 This disparity registered in lending companies’ reluctance, and even outright refusal, to accept wa-
ter rights as collateral for credit. See Schorr, The Colorado Doctrine, 127–128.
84 White, Railroaded, chap. 4.
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commentators such as Adams, for whom instability and risk were constant sources of
anxiety, western delegates did not appear to be obsessed with imposing a rationalized
order on an ever-changing situation. They instead focused on the economic trajectory
of the various states and their position in the broader geography of national and
world markets. Preoccupied with fostering a measure of relative economic autonomy
for the region, they pushed back against the centralizing tendencies of national cor-
porations and worked to counterbalance them with local and regional manufacturing
and trade. Breen reflected on this conflict: “When it comes to a question of corpora-
tions and the mechanics, laborers, and business men of the territory,” he said, “I
think it is to the interest of the people of Montana that it shall be the corporations
that will suffer.”85 The ideal was not isolation from national and world commerce,
but the emergence of overlapping markets of varying geographical scales, with com-
merce and industry pursued by a diverse array of businesses.86
Quite explicitly, delegates were not content with their region’s peripheral status
as a provider of raw materials, primarily minerals, which threatened to perpetually
leave it in a dependent and vulnerable position. They were concerned about their
long-term viability and sought to broaden the economic base of their respective
states. As Knowles explained in Montana, hinting at the settlers’ own environmental
sensibility, “The wealth that is created by mines passes away in the next fifty or one
hundred years perhaps,” so it was important for the state to nurture a greater diver-
sity of economic pursuits, in industry and agriculture, which would become a lasting
source of well-being and prosperity: “if we can settle up our valleys with a thriving
farm population we know that here will be permanent wealth . . . property that will
remain the property of the country.”87 Pro-corporate delegates played to these senti-
ments. They argued that heavy capital investment in mining would naturally have a
multiplying effect and inevitably flow to other sectors. Clark optimistically proposed
that “the expenditure of large sums of money” in mining would “result in the foster-
ing and development of other great industries.”88 Hoyt took that to be the main les-
son from the experience of Colorado: “Why has Colorado become the great state she
is? Because she has welcomed capital, she has not closed her gates, she has opened
them wide, and Colorado today is a workshop. Colorado is alive with industry.”89 The
sense of urgency around regulating railroad and water corporations suggests that most
delegates were not convinced. They associated unbridled corporate power—an unwise
“opening of the gates”—with one-dimensional and ultimately unsustainable develop-
ment.
The effort to endow the new states with capacious regulatory powers vis-a-vis the
railroads, and especially in regard to freight rates, owed a lot to these concerns about
long-term sustainable development. Many of the conventions took place in the after-
math of the Supreme Court’s decision in the Wabash case in 1886, which curtailed
state-level authority to regulate interstate commerce.90 In response, delegates fought
85 Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention . . . of . . . Montana, 709.
86 George Miller’s classic study and Berk’s more recent one both engage this point. See George Hall
Miller, Railroads and the Granger Laws (Madison, Wis., 1971); Berk, Alternative Tracks.
87 Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention . . . of . . . Montana, 499.
88 Ibid., 127, emphasis added.
89 Journal and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Wyoming, 672.
90 Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Railway Company v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886).
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to expand the definition of intrastate commerce and the scope of their jurisdiction
over it. They required all corporations transacting business within their states to
open offices and appoint representative agents within those states, which would be
required to meet each state’s regulatory and information disclosure requirements.
Locally chartered railroad lines that were acquired by “foreign” corporations and in-
tegrated into larger railroad systems, they declared, would remain under the jurisdic-
tion of state courts and thus subject to local regulation. Most crucially, long-and-
short-haul clauses, which required that freight rates remain proportional to distance,
prohibited railroads from shifting the costs of long-distance traffic, where profit mar-
gins were squeezed by competition, over to local traffic, where competition among
railroads was limited and rates could more easily be raised.91 Low freight rates within
states, relative to interstate commerce, protected regional manufacturers and dis-
couraged importation of goods from national urban centers like New York and Chi-
cago. This was not a backward-looking initiative, a doomed effort to resist the dy-
namic logic of modernity, but an attempt to facilitate the emergence of a more
decentralized political-economic geography and countervail the tendency of low
long-haul freight rates to build up a handful of mega-metropolises.92
One of the most striking features of the constitutional struggles in the different
states, despite their many similarities, was their indeterminacy, and therefore the het-
erogeneity of their outcomes. Access to large pools of capital and powerful networks
of trust and information that spanned across long distances gave pro-finance forces
immense leverage. Their power, however, remained far from absolute. The political
pushback from farmers, workers, small businessmen, and other settlers scored mean-
ingful victories, assimilating elements of their own vision into the political framework
in the areas of tax policy, infrastructure, social services, government oversight, labor
rights, and public control of natural resources. The final drafts of the constitutions,
as adopted, were not a clear triumph for any particular interest. They bore the mark
of the divides and disagreements that had surfaced during the writing process. They
varied based on the conditions of different industries and economic sectors at the
time of the convention and on the ability of the respective parties to mobilize and
rally support.
91 See Constitution of the State of Idaho, Article XI, secs. 10, 14; Constitution of the State of Mon-
tana, Article XV, secs. 11, 15; Constitution of the State of Wyoming, Article X, “Railroads,” sec. 8; Con-
stitution of the State of Washington, Article XII, sec. 7; Constitution of the State of Colorado, Article
XV, sec. 10; Constitution of the State of North Dakota, Article VII, secs. 136, 140.
92 The predominant interpretation of low long-haul freight rates as an expression of strict economic
and thus apolitical terms, driven by the railroad’s high fixed costs, dates back to Arthur T. Hadley, Rail-
road Transportation: Its History and Its Laws (New York, 1885). It has been most memorably and lucidly
elaborated in Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis, 81–93. Since these “laws” operated outside the purview of pol-
itics, Cronon concluded, Granger agitation (and populism more generally) could only be attributed to
the ignorance of the farmers, who “did not fully understand” and “did not fully grasp” the unassailable
“logic of capital” (139). Richard White has more recently questioned this view, noting that in fact “the
ratio of variable to fixed costs was almost the reverse of what Hadley posited.” The railroads, he con-
cluded, “did not base their rates on the cost of service, which they were incapable of determining,” but
rather “set rates experimentally . . . according to what the traffic would bear.” In other words, the struc-
tural imperative of railroads to prioritize long over short and medium haul has been vastly overstated.
White, Railroaded, 331, 162. White owes much in this respect to Gerald Berk, Louis D. Brandeis and the
Making of Regulated Competition, 1900–1932 (Cambridge, 2009), 74–78; Gregory L. Thompson, “Misused
Product Costing in the American Railroad Industry: Southern Pacific Passenger Service between the
Wars,” Business History Review 63, no. 3 (1989): 510–554.
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In Idaho, for example, the constitution included a strong set of labor provisions
outlawing the deployment of private police forces and the hiring out of convict labor.
The constitution dictated the formation of a Bureau of Immigration, Labor and Sta-
tistics and set the length of the workday at eight hours for all government work. Min-
ing interests, however, were powerful enough to eliminate the clauses that required
regulation of safety in mines, held employers liable for workers’ injury, and disal-
lowed the blacklisting of labor leaders. They were also able to avoid a clause enforc-
ing a tax on the net proceeds of mines.93 Farmers in the state proved to be a more
potent political force than industrial workers. The constitution thus subjected rail-
road corporations to assertive regulation, including government oversight of freight
charges and prohibition of discriminatory rates. Tax breaks and other subsidies to
private business interests were made illegal, tying the hands of overeager or pliable
state legislators in their future dealings with corporations.94 The constitution, further-
more, declared all waters appropriated for “sale, rental or distribution” to be for
“public use, and subject to the regulations and control of the state.” It prioritized ag-
ricultural over industrial uses of water, set firm limits on the transfer of water rights,
and explicitly sanctioned the regulation of water rates. It did not, however, form a
water commission to enforce these policies, leaving that to the discretion of the legis-
lature.95
Similar battles in Colorado, Montana, Wyoming, Washington, and North Dakota
produced an uneven and unpredictable range of outcomes. The constitutions of
Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming, for example, called for an eight-hour workday in all
government works. That provision failed to pass in Colorado, Washington, and North
Dakota.96 The constitutions of Colorado, Wyoming, and Washington mandated strict
regulation of safety in mines. Those of Idaho, Montana, and North Dakota did not.97
Washington was the only one of the six states that failed to restrict child labor in
mines. Where age limits were imposed, however, they varied from sixteen years in
Montana and fourteen in Idaho and Wyoming to twelve in Colorado and North Da-
kota, which extended this restriction to underage work in factories and workshops.98
All six constitutions declared railroads to be common carriers and prohibited undue
discrimination between users and locales. However, the constitutions of Montana,
Washington, Idaho, and North Dakota explicitly authorized state regulation of rail-
road freight and passenger rates. In Colorado and Wyoming, this clause was struck
out.99 The constitutions of Montana, Idaho, and Washington included explicit long-
93 Idaho Constitution, Art. XIV, sec. 6; Art. XIII, sec. 3; Art. VIII, sec. 1; Art. XIII, sec. 2.
94 Ibid., Art. XI, secs. 5, 6; Art. XI, secs. 10, 14; Art. VII, secs. 2, 4, 8.
95 Ibid., Art. XV, sec. 1; Art. XV, sec. 3; Art. XV, sec. 4; Art. XV, sec. 2.
96 Ibid., Art. XIII, sec. 2; Montana Constitution, Art. XVIII, sec. 2; Wyoming Constitution, Art.
XIX, sec. 1.
97 Colorado Constitution, Art. XVI, secs. 2, 3; Wyoming Constitution, Art. IX, sec. 2; Washington
Constitution, Art. II, sec. 35.
98 Montana Constitution, Art. XVIII, sec. 3; Idaho Constitution, Art. XIII, sec. 4; Wyoming Consti-
tution, Art. IX, sec. 3; Colorado Constitution, Art. XVI, sec. 2; North Dakota Constitution, Art. XVII,
sec. 209. Wyoming’s constitution prohibited all females from working in the mines. It did not, however,
include a prohibition on blacklisting labor organizers, convict labor, and the formation of a labor bureau.
99 Montana Constitution, Art. XV, sec. 5; Idaho Constitution, Art. XI, sec. 5; Washington Constitu-
tion, Art. XII, sec. 18; North Dakota Constitution, Art. VII, sec. 142. Following the struggle in Washing-
ton, the convention aborted the formation of a permanent regulatory body, stipulating merely that “a
railroad and transportation commission may be established”; Washington Constitution, Art. XII, sec. 18.
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and-short-haul clauses, requiring rates to correspond to distance, but those of Colo-
rado, North Dakota, and Wyoming did not.100 Colorado exempted mines from spe-
cial taxation for ten years from adoption of the constitution. Wyoming and Montana
mandated a tax on gross product from the onset of statehood. Idaho, Washington,
and North Dakota left this tax entirely out of their final drafts.101 Lastly, all states re-
served water for public uses, subject to “beneficial” appropriation. However, whereas
the deliberations in Montana, Washington, and North Dakota whittled down the is-
sue of water to a single obtuse clause, Colorado, Wyoming, and Idaho included more
elaborate articles on this topic. Colorado and Wyoming established permanent state
commissions to oversee the allocation of water. Colorado and Idaho prioritized do-
mestic and agricultural over industrial uses. Idaho included a special clause subject-
ing prior appropriation to “reasonable limitations” in dry seasons. Colorado alone
explicitly empowered its commissioners to establish “reasonable maximum rates.”102
The tug of war between investors and populists, therefore, produced a variety of
legal regimes, depending on the contingent progression of each constitutional con-
vention. This is how issues of legibility and spatiality intersected. The comprehensi-
bility of political institutions was not merely in contention within each individual
state, but also in the overall cluster of western states, each with its own property
rights regime (under the sovereignty of state courts), regulatory apparatus (con-
trolled by elected state commissioners), and framework for industrial relations (me-
diated through a democratically elected legislature, courts of arbitration, and labor
unions). Constitutional provisions had to be followed up by legislation in state assem-
blies and then implemented by local officials, which would leave the entire apparatus
in a radically uncertain flux in years to come. The constitutional conventions, there-
fore, enacted an uneven regulatory landscape that national corporations would have
struggled to traverse. In the absence of measures to the contrary by federal authori-
ties over the next several decades, led by the unelected Supreme Court, the consoli-
dation of the national market, rather than preordained or necessary, seemed more
likely to derail and fracture.103 Instead of culminating in a “flat world,” market inte-
gration produced a complex new geography, an institutional patchwork that was
never fully transcended in the twentieth century.104
HISTORIANS OF THE UNITED STATES have long debated the nature of western populism
at the end of the nineteenth century. They have disagreed over whether populism, in
its different political iterations, signaled the resilient (and often sinister) influence of
100 Montana Constitution, Art. XV, secs. 5, 7; Idaho Constitution, Art. XI, secs. 5, 6; Wyoming Con-
stitution, Art. X, sec. 7, and Art. XII, sec. 15; Washington Constitution, Art. XII, sec. 13; Colorado Con-
stitution, Art. XV, sec. 4; North Dakota Constitution, Art. VII, sec. 142.
101 Colorado Constitution, Art. X, sec. 3; Wyoming Constitution, Art. XV, sec. 3; Montana Constitu-
tion, Art. XII, sec. 3.
102 Montana Constitution, Art. III, sec. 15; Washington Constitution, Art. XXI, sec. 1; North Dakota
Constitution, Art. XVII, sec. 210; Idaho Constitution, Art. XV, secs. 1–6; Colorado Constitution, Art.
XVI, secs. 5–8; Wyoming Constitution, Art. VIII, secs. 1–5.
103 Bensel, The Political Economy of American Industrialization, 321.
104 For the articulation of this metaphor in relation to modern-day globalization, see Thomas L.
Friedman, The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century (New York, 2005).
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outmoded pre-industrial ideas in modern American politics or rather the hopeful (at
times almost utopian) grassroots origins of modern liberalism. Did it mark the last
hurrah of an already superseded mode of nineteenth-century politics or the opening
shots in the development of twentieth-century “Progressive” reform? Situated in the
context of a deeply contested and contradictory global transformation—a trajectory
that headed toward no logical or necessary point of culmination—populism defies
both of these characterizations. Neither a rearguard nor a vanguard, populists did
not position themselves in relation to the unfolding of a predetermined historical arc.
Rather, they mobilized as active historical agents in a struggle to shape the emer-
gence of the modern political economy. They drew on earlier ideas but freely inno-
vated as they saw fit. In rallying around fundamental policy questions—property
rights, government regulation, industrial relations, and, more broadly, the relation-
ship between regions in the world economy—they grasped the contradictory, mallea-
ble, and relatively open-ended nature of global integration in this formative pe-
riod.105
American populists, therefore, belong properly alongside other grassroots move-
ments around the world that remained skeptical of liberal institutions and sought to
embed global capital in more accountable political frameworks. Their efforts, even
those that were defeated, are analytically significant precisely for loosening the con-
ceptual teleology of modernization templates that have done so much to depoliticize
economic questions and obliterate alternative visions of development. Their battles,
examined in a geographically broad framework of analysis, allow us to fully appreci-
ate the constitutive role of local and regional politics in a seemingly inexorable struc-
tural transformation.106 These efforts were not barren. They produced lasting pockets
of local power and state-level autonomy within the federal structure of American
politics. Historians of the United States in the twentieth century have begun to
grapple with the implications of these structural wrinkles in what once appeared to
be the unchallenged blanket authority of the federal government.107 On a more
global scale, historians are gradually uncovering the connections between worldwide
economic integration in the late nineteenth century and growing nationalization and
regionalization.108 These lasting challenges to the centralization of power are more
105 These dynamics bear out Geyer and Bright’s discerning analysis of how the history of globaliza-
tion, rather than displacing local and regional histories, in fact reveals the full significance of all regions
to world history “as actors and participants in the very processes being narrated”; “World History in a
Global Age,” 1044–1045, quote from 1045.
106 This affirms Gregory Downs’s insight that “historians may be able to fully understand domestic
politics only through the lens of transnationalism, and the ironies of transnationalism only through do-
mestic politics”; “The Mexicanization of American Politics,” 409.
107 See Gerstle, “The Resilient Power of the States across the Long Nineteenth Century”; Kimberley S.
Johnson, Governing the American State: Congress and the New Federalism, 1877–1929 (Princeton, N.J., 2007);
Thomas J. Sugrue, “All Politics Is Local: The Persistence of Localism in Twentieth-Century America,” in
Meg Jacobs, William J. Novak, and Julian E. Zelizer, eds., The Democratic Experiment: New Directions in
American Political History (Princeton, N.J., 2003), 301–326; Karen M. Tani, States of Dependency: Welfare,
Rights, and American Governance, 1935–1972 (New York, 2016); Tami J. Friedman, “Exploiting the North-
South Differential: Corporate Power, Southern Politics, and the Decline of Organized Labor after World
War II,” Journal of American History 95, no. 2 (2008): 323–348; Elizabeth Tandy Shermer, Sunbelt Capital-
ism: Phoenix and the Transformation of American Politics (Philadelphia, 2013).
108 Vanessa Ogle, The Global Transformation of Time, 1870–1950 (Cambridge, Mass., 2015); Sebas-
tian Conrad, Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany (Cambridge, 2010).
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properly understood not as remnants of an earlier age, but as fully integral to the
process of market-making itself. They did not slowly fade, but rather created an
enduring spatial legacy, an inherently uneven terrain for future struggle.
Noam Maggor is a Postdoctoral Associate in the Department of History at Cor-
nell University, where he teaches courses on the history of capitalism and the his-
tory of globalization. He is the author of Brahmin Capitalism: Frontiers of Wealth
and Populism in America’s First Gilded Age (Harvard University Press, 2017) and
editor of the special issue of the Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era on
the history of capitalism (July 2016). He is currently at work on a book tentatively
entitled “The United States as a Developing Nation,” which will examine the
transformation of American capitalism in the late nineteenth century from a
broad global and comparative perspective.
84 Noam Maggor
AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW FEBRUARY 2017
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article-abstract/122/1/55/2967348
by Cornell University Library user
on 12 December 2017
